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Abstract
We investigate the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous
games. Our main algorithmic result is the following: For any n-player anonymous game with
a bounded number of strategies and any constant δ > 0, an O(1/n1−δ)-approximate Nash
equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. Complementing this positive result, we show
that if there exists any constant δ > 0 such that an O
(
1/n1+δ
)
-approximate equilibrium can be
computed in polynomial time, then there is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for
this problem.
We also present a faster algorithm that, for any n-player k-strategy anonymous game, runs in
time O˜
(
(n+ k)knk
)
and computes an O˜
(
n−1/3k11/3
)
-approximate equilibrium. This algorithm
follows from the existence of simple approximate equilibria of anonymous games, where each
player plays one strategy with probability 1−δ, for some small δ, and plays uniformly at random
with probability δ.
Our approach exploits the connection between Nash equilibria in anonymous games and
Poisson multinomial distributions (PMDs). Specifically, we prove a new probabilistic lemma
establishing the following: Two PMDs, with large variance in each direction, whose first few
moments are approximately matching are close in total variation distance. Our structural result
strengthens previous work by providing a smooth tradeoff between the variance bound and the
number of matching moments.
∗Supported in part by Shang-Hua Teng’s Simons Investigator Award.
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1 Introduction
Anonymous games are multiplayer games in which the utility of each player depends on her own
strategy, as well as the number (as opposed to the identity) of other players who play each of the
strategies. Anonymous games comprise an important class of succinct games — well-studied in the
economics literature (see, e.g., [Mil96, Blo99, Blo05]) — capturing a wide range of phenomena that
frequently arise in practice, including congestion games, voting systems, and auctions.
In recent years, anonymous games have attracted significant attention in TCS [DP07, DP08,
DP09, DP15, GT15, CDO15, DDKT16, DKS16a], with a focus on understanding the computational
complexity of their (approximate) Nash equilibria. Consider the family of anonymous games where
the number of players, n, is large and the number of strategies, k, is bounded. It was recently
shown by Chen et al. [CDO15] that computing an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of these games
is PPAD-Complete when ǫ is exponentially small, even for anonymous games with 5 strategies1.
On the algorithmic side, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [DP07, DP08] presented the first polynomial-
time approximation scheme (PTAS) for this problem with running time n(1/ǫ)
Ω(k)
. For the case of
2-strategies, this bound was improved [DP09, DDS12, DP15] to poly(n) · (1/ǫ)O(log2(1/ǫ)), and sub-
sequently sharpened to poly(n) · (1/ǫ)O(log(1/ǫ)) in [DKS16b]).
In recent work, Daskalakis et al. [DDKT16] and Diakonikolas et al. [DKS16a] generalized the
aforementioned results [DP15, DKS16b] to any fixed number k of strategies, obtaining algorithms
for computing ǫ-well-supported equilibria with runtime of the form npoly(k) · (1/ǫ)k log(1/ǫ)O(k) . That
is, the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games with a fixed num-
ber of strategies admits an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (EPTAS). Moreover,
the dependence of the running time on the parameter 1/ǫ is quasi-polynomial – as opposed to
exponential.
We note that all the aforementioned algorithmic results are obtained by exploiting a connection
between Nash equilibria in anonymous games and Poisson multinomial distributions (PMDs). This
connection – formalized in [DP07, DP08] – translates constructive upper bounds on ǫ-covers for
PMDs to upper bounds on computing ǫ-Nash equilibria in anonymous games (see Section 2 for
formal definitions). Unfortunately, as shown in [DDKT16, DKS16a], this “cover-based” approach
cannot lead to qualitatively faster algorithms, due to a matching existential lower bound on the
size of the corresponding ǫ-covers. In a related algorithmic work, Goldberg and Turchetta [GT15]
studied two-strategy anonymous games (k = 2) and designed a polynomial-time algorithm that
computes an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria for ǫ = Ω(n−1/4).
The aforementioned discussion prompts the following natural question: What is the precise
approximability of computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games? In this paper, we make progress
on this question by establishing the following result: For any δ > 0, and any n-player anonymous
game with a constant number of strategies, there exists a polyδ(n) time algorithm that computes
an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of the game, for ǫ = 1/n1−δ 2. Moreover, we show that the
existence of a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium for
ǫ = 1/n1+δ, for any small constant δ > 0 – i.e., slightly better than the approximation guarantee
of our algorithm – would imply the existence of a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
1[CDO15] showed that computing an equilibrium of 7-strategy anonymous games is PPAD-Complete, but 3 of the
7 strategies in their construction can be merged, resulting in a 5-strategy anonymous game.
2The runtime of our algorithm depends exponentially in 1/δ. We remind the reader that the algorithms
of [DDKT16, DKS16a] run in quasi-polynomial time for any value of ǫ inverse polynomial in n.
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(FPTAS) for the problem. That is, we essentially show that the value ǫ = 1/n is the threshold
for the polynomial-time approximability of Nash equilibria in anonymous games, unless there is an
FPTAS. In the following subsection, we describe our results in detail and provide an overview of
our techniques.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We study the following question:
For n-player k-strategy anonymous games, how small can ǫ be (as a function of n), so
that an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time?
Upper Bounds. We present two different algorithms (Theorems 1.1 and 1.2) for computing
approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games. Both algorithms run in polynomial time and
compute ǫ-approximate equilibria for an inverse polynomial ǫ above a certain threshold.
Theorem 1.1 (Main). For any δ > 0, and any n-player k-strategy anonymous game, there is a
polyδ,k(n) time algorithm that computes an (1/n
1−δ)-approximate equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 1.2. For any n-player k-strategy anonymous game, we can compute an O˜
(
n−1/3k11/3
)
-
approximate equilibrium in time O˜
(
(n+ k)knk
)
.
Prior to our work, for k > 2, no polynomial time ǫ-approximation was known for any inverse
polynomial ǫ. For k = 2, the best previous result is due to [GT15] who gave a polynomial-time
algorithm for ǫ = Ω(n−1/4).
Overview of Techniques. The high-level idea of our approach is this: If the desired accuracy
ǫ is above a certain threshold, we do not need to enumerate over an ǫ-cover for the set of all
PMDs. Our approach is in part inspired by [GT15], who design an algorithm (for k = 2 and
ǫ = Ω(n−1/4)) in which all players use one of the two pre-selected mixed strategies. We note
that for k = 2, PMDs are tantamount to Poisson Binomial distributions (PBDs), i.e., sums of
independent Bernoulli random variables. The [GT15] algorithm can be equivalently interpreted as
guessing a PBD from an appropriately small set. One reason this idea succeeds is the following: If
every player randomizes, then the variance of the resulting PBD must be relatively high, and (as a
result) the corresponding subset of PBDs has a smaller cover.
Our quantitative improvement for the k = 2 case is obtained as follows: Instead of enforcing
players to selected specific mixed strategies – as in [GT15] – we show that there always exists an
ǫ-approximate equilibrium where the associated PBD has variance at least Θ(nǫ). When ǫ = n−c
for some c < 1, the variance is an inverse polynomial of n. We then construct a polynomial-size
ǫ-cover for the subset of PBDs with variance at least this much, which leads to a polynomial-time
algorithm for computing ǫ-approximate equilibria in 2-strategy anonymous games.
The idea for the general case of k > 2 is similar, but the details are more elaborate, since
the structure of PMDs is more complicated for k > 2. We proceed as follows: We start by
showing that there is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium whose corresponding PMD has a large variance
in each direction. Our main structural result is a robust moment-matching lemma (Lemma 3.4),
which states that the closeness in low-degree moments of two PMDs, with large variance in each
direction, implies their closeness in total variation distance. The proof of this lemma uses Fourier
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analytic techniques, building on and strengthening previous work [DKS16a]. As a consequence of
our moment-matching lemma, we can construct a polynomial-size (ǫ/5)-cover for PMDs with such
large variance. We then iterate through this cover to find an ǫ-approximate equilibrium, using a
dynamic programming approach similar to the one in [DP15].
We now provide a brief intuition of our moment-matching lemma. Intuitively, if the two PMDs
in question are both very close to discrete Gaussians, then the closeness in the first two moments is
sufficient. Lemma 3.4 can be viewed as a generalization of this intuition, which gives a quantitative
tradeoff between the number of moments we need to approximately match and the size of the
variance. The proof of Lemma 3.4 exploits the sparsity of the Fourier transform of our PMDs, and
the fact that higher variance allows us to take fewer terms in the Taylor expansion when we use
moments to approximate the logarithmic Fourier transform. This completes the proof sketch of
Theorem 1.1.
Our second algorithm (Theorem 1.2) addresses the need to play simple strategies. Players
tend to favor simple strategies which are easier to learn and implement, even if these strategies
might have slightly sub-optimal payoffs [Sim82]. In addition, our algorithm is significantly faster
in this case. We build on the idea of [GT15] to “smooth” an anonymous game by forcing all
the players to randomize. We prove that the perturbed game is Lipschitz and therefore admits a
pure Nash equilibrium, which corresponds to simple approximate equilibria of a specific form in
the original game: Each player plays one strategy with probability 1 − δ for some small δ, and
plays other strategies uniformly at random with probability δ. To prove that the perturbed game
is Lipschitz, we make essential use of the recently established multivariate central limit theorem
(CLT) in Daskalakis et al. [DDKT16] and Diakonikolas, Kane and Stewart [DKS16a] to show that
if we add a little more noise (corresponding to δ = Θ(n−1/3)), the associated PMD is sufficiently
close to a discrete Gaussian.
Lower Bounds. When ǫ = 1/n, we can show that there is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium where
the associated PMD has a variance at least 1/k in every direction. Unfortunately, the PMDs in
the explicit quasi-polynomial-size lower bounds given in [DDKT16, DKS16a] satisfy this property.
Thus, we need a different approach to get a polynomial-time algorithm for ǫ = 1/n or smaller.
In fact, we prove the following results, which states that even a slight improvement of our upper
bound in Theorem 1.1 would imply an FPTAS for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games.
It is important to note that Theorem 1.3 applies to all algorithms, not only the ones that leverage
the structure of PMDs.
Theorem 1.3. For n-player k-strategy anonymous games with k = O(1), if we can compute an
O(n−c)-approximate equilibrium in polynomial time for some constant c > 1, then there is an
FPTAS 3 for computing (well-supported) Nash equilibria of k-strategy anonymous games.
Remark. As observed in [DDKT16], because there is a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for
computing an (n−c)-approximate equilibrium in anonymous games, the problem cannot be PPAD-
Complete unless PPAD ⊆ Quasi-PTIME. On the other hand, we do not know how to improve the
quasi-polynomial-time upper bounds of [DDKT16, DKS16a] when ǫ < 1/n.
Recall that computing an ǫ-approximate equilibrium of a two-player general-sum n × n game
(2-NASH) for constant ǫ also admits a quasi-polynomial-time algorithm [LMM03]. Very recently,
3A fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) is an algorithm that runs in time poly(n, 1/ǫ) and
returns an ǫ-optimal solution, or in our context, returns an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium.
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Rubinstein [Rub16] showed that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis (ETH) for PPAD, for
some sufficiently small universal constant ǫ > 0, quasi-polynomial-time is necessary to compute an
ǫ-approximate equilibrium of 2-NASH. It is a plausible conjecture that quasi-polynomial-time is
also required for ǫ-Nash equilibria in anonymous games, when ǫ = n−c for some constant c > 1. In
particular, this would imply that there is no FPTAS for computing approximate Nash equilibria in
anonymous games, and consequently the upper bound of Theorem 1.1 is essentially tight.
2 Notation and Background
Anonymous Games. We study anonymous games (n, k, {uia}i∈[n],a∈[k]) with n players labeled
by [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and k common strategies labeled by [k] for each player. The payoff of a player
depends on her own strategy, and how many of her peers choose which strategy, but not on their
identities. When player i ∈ [n] plays strategy a ∈ [k], her payoffs are given by a function uia
that maps the possible outcomes (partitions of all other players) Πkn−1 to the interval [0, 1], where
Πkn−1 = {(x1, . . . , xk) | xj ∈ R ∧
∑k
j=1 xj = n− 1}.
Approximate Equilibria. We denote by ∆S a distribution on the set S. A mixed strategy is
an element of ∆[k], and a mixed strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) maps every player i to her mixed
strategy si ∈ ∆[k]. We use s−i to denote the strategies of players other than i in s.
A mixed strategy profile s is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium for some ǫ ≥ 0 iff
∀i ∈ [n],∀a′ ∈ [k], E
x∼s−i
[
uia′(x)
]
≤ E
x∼s−i,a∼si
[
uia(x)
]
+ ǫ,
where x ∈ Πkn−1 is the partition formed by n− 1 random samples (independently) drawn from [k]
according to the distributions s−i. Note that given a mixed strategy profile s, we can compute
a player’s expected payoff to precision ǫ in time poly(nk log(1/ǫ)) by straightforward dynamic
programming, and hence throughout this paper we assume that we can compute players’ payoffs
exactly given their mixed strategies.
Poisson Multinomial Distributions. A k-Categorical Random Variable (k-CRV) is a vector
random variable supported on the set of k-dimensional basis vectors {e1, . . . , ek}. A k-CRV is
i-maximal if ei is its most likely outcome (break ties by taking the smallest index i). A k-Poisson
Multinomial Distribution of order n, or an (n, k)-PMD, is a vector random variable of the form
X =
∑n
i=1Xi where the Xi’s are independent k-CRVs. The case of k = 2 is usually referred to as
Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD).
Note that a mixed strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) of an n-player k-strategy anonymous game
corresponds to the k-CRVs {X1, . . . ,Xn} where Pr[Xi = ea] = si(a). The expected payoff of player
i ∈ [n] for playing pure strategy a ∈ [k] can also be written as E[uia(X−i)] = E[uia (∑j 6=i,j∈[n]Xj)].
Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi be an (n, k)-PMD such that for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k] we denote pi,j = Pr[Xi =
ej ], where
∑k
j=1 pi,j = 1. For m = (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ Zk+, we define the mth-parameter moments of
X to be Mm(X)
def
=
∑n
i=1
∏k
j=1 p
mj
i,j . We refer to ‖m‖1 =
∑k
j=1mj as the degree of the parameter
moment Mm(X).
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Total Variation Distance and Covers. The total variation distance between two distributions
P and Q supported on a finite domain A is
dTV(P,Q) := max
S⊆A
|P (S)−Q(S)| = (1/2) · ‖P −Q‖1.
If X and Y are two random variables ranging over a finite set, their total variation distance
dTV(X,Y ) is defined as the total variation distance between their distributions. For convenience,
we will often blur the distinction between a random variable and its distribution.
Let (X , d) be a metric space. Given ǫ > 0, a subset Y ⊆ X is said to be a proper ǫ-cover of X
with respect to the metric d : X 2 → R+, if for every X ∈ X there exists some Y ∈ Y such that
d(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ. In this work, we will be interested in constructing ǫ-covers for high-variance PMDs
under the total variation distance metric.
Multidimensional Fourier Transform. For x ∈ R, we will denote e(x) def= exp(−2πix). The
(continuous) Fourier Transform of a function F : Z → C is the function F̂ : [0, 1]k → C defined as
F̂ (ξ) =
∑
x∈Zk e(ξ · x)F (x). For the case that F is a probability mass function, we can equivalently
write F̂ (ξ) = Ex∼F [e(ξ · x)].
Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi be an (n, k)-PMD with pi,j
def
= Pr[Xi = ej ]. To avoid clutter in the notation,
we will sometimes use the symbol X to denote the corresponding probability mass function. With
this convention, we can write that X̂(ξ) =
∏n
i=1 X̂i(ξ) =
∏n
i=1
∑k
j=1 e(ξj)pi,j.
3 Searching Fewer Moments: Proof of Theorem 1.1
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that, for n-player anonymous games with
bounded number of strategies, computes an ǫ-approximate equilibrium with ǫ = n−c for any con-
stant c < 1. As a warm up, we start by describing the simpler setting of two-strategy anonymous
games (k = 2). The main results of this section is Theorem 1.1 that applies to general k-strategy
anonymous games for any constant k ≥ 2.
At a high level, we first prove the existence of ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria in which the
corresponding PMDs have high variance and every player randomizes (Lemma 3.1). We then use
our robust moment matching lemma (Lemma 3.4) to show that when two PMDs have high variances,
the closeness in their constant-degree parameter moments implies their closeness in total variation
distance. The fact that matching the constant-degree moments suffices allows us to construct a
polynomial-size (ǫ/5)-cover for set subset of all PMDs with large variance. We then iterate through
this cover to find an ǫ-approximate equilibrium (Algorithm 2).
Lemma 3.1. For an n-player k-strategy anonymous game, there always exists an ǫ-approximate
equilibrium where every player plays each strategy with probability at least ǫk−1 .
Proof. Given an anonymous game G = (n, k, {uia}i∈[n],a∈[k]), we smooth players’ utility functions
by requiring every player to randomize. Fix ǫ > 0, we define an ǫ-perturbed game Gǫ as follows.
When a player plays some pure strategy a ∈ [k] in Gǫ, we map it back to the original game as if she
plays strategy j with probability 1− ǫ, and plays some other strategy a′ 6= a uniformly at random
(i.e., she plays a′ with probability ǫk−1). Her payoff in Gǫ also accounts for such perturbation, and
is defined to be her expected payoff given that all the players (including herself) would deviate to
other strategies uniformly at random with probability ǫ.
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Formally, let Xǫ(ej) denote the k-CRV that takes value ej with probability 1 − ǫ, and takes
value ej′ with probability
ǫ
k−1 for each j
′ 6= j. The payoff structure of Gǫ is given by
u′ia(x) := (1− ǫ)E
[
uia(Mǫ(x))
]
+
ǫ
k − 1
∑
a′ 6=a
E
[
uia′(Mǫ(x))
]
, ∀i ∈ [n], a ∈ [k], x ∈ Πkn−1,
where Mǫ(x) =
∑
j∈[k] xjXǫ(ej) is an (n − 1, k)-PMD that corresponds to the perturbed outcome
of the partition x ∈ Πkn−1 of all other players.
Let s′ = (s′1, . . . , s′n) denote any exact Nash equilibrium of Gǫ. We can interpret this mixed
strategy profile in G equivalently as s = (s1, . . . , sn), where si = (1 − kǫk−1)s′i + ǫk−11, where
1 = (1, . . . , 1). We know that under s each player has no incentive to deviate to the mixed
strategies Xǫ(ej) for all j ∈ [k], therefore a player can gain at most ǫ by deviating to pure strategies
in G, so s is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium with si(j) ≥ ǫk−1 for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k].
Warm-up: The Case of k = 2 Strategies. For two-strategy anonymous games (k = 2), if
all the players put at least ǫ probability mass on both strategies, the resulting PBD is going to
have variance at least nǫ(1 − ǫ). When ǫ = n−c for some constant c < 1, the variance is at least
Θ
(
n1−c
)
= nΘ(1). We can now use the following lemma from [DKS16c], which states that if two
PBDs P and Q are close in the first few moments, then P and Q are ǫ-close in total variation
distance. Note that without any assumption on the variance of the PBDs, we would need to check
the first O(log(1/ǫ)) moments, but when the variance is nΩ(1), which is the case in our application,
we only need the first constant number of moments to match.
Lemma 3.2 ([DKS16c]). Let ǫ > 0. Let P and Q be n-PBDs with P having parameters p1, . . . , ps ≤
1/2 and p′1, . . . , p
′
s′ > 1/2, and Q having parameters q1, . . . , qs ≤ 1/2 and q′1, . . . , q′s′ > 1/2. Suppose
that V = Var[P ] + 1 = Θ(Var[Q] + 1) and let C > 0 be a sufficiently large constant. Suppose
furthermore that for A = C
√
log(1/ǫ)/V and for all positive integers ℓ it holds
Aℓ
∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
i=1
pℓi −
s∑
i=1
qℓi
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
s′∑
i=1
(1− p′i)ℓ −
s′∑
i=1
(1− q′i)ℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 < ǫ
C log(1/ǫ)
(1)
Then dTV(P,Q) < ǫ.
Let ǫ = n−c. For Lemma 3.2 we have V ≥ nǫ(1− ǫ) and A = Θ
(√
log(1/ǫ)/V
)
= O
(√
logn
n1−c
)
.
The difference in the moments of parameters of P and Q in Equation (1) is bounded from above
by n, so whenever ℓ > 2+2c1−c , the condition in Lemma 3.2 is automatically satisfied for sufficiently
large n because
Aℓn = O
(
logℓ/2 n
n(1−c)ℓ/2
n
)
<
1
C · nc · c log n =
ǫ
C log(1/ǫ)
.
So it is enough to search over the first ℓ = Θ
(
1
1−c
)
moments when each player put probability at
least Ω(n−c) on both strategies. The algorithm for finding such an ǫ-approximate equilibrium uses
moment search and dynamic programming, and is given for the case of general k in the remainder
of this section.
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The General Case: k Strategies. We now present our algorithm for n-player anonymous
games with k > 2 strategies and prove Theorem 1.1. The intuition of the k = 2 case carries
over to the general case, but the details are more elaborate. First, we show (Claim 3.3) that there
exists an ǫ-approximate equilibrium whose corresponding PMD has variance (nǫ/k) in all directions
orthogonal to the vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1). Then, we prove (Lemma 3.4) that when two PMDs have
such high variances, the closeness in their constant-degree parameter moments translates to their
closeness in total variation distance. This structural result allows us to build a polynomial-size
cover for all PMDs with high variance, which leads to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing
ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria (Algorithm 2).
We first prove that when all the players put probability at least ǫk−1 on each strategy, the
covariance matrix of the resulting PMD has relatively large eigenvalues, except the zero eigenvalue
associated with the all-one eigenvector. The all-one eigenvector has eigenvalue zero because the
coordinates of X always sum to n.
Claim 3.3. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi be an (n, k)-PMD and let Σ be the covariance matrix of X. If
pi,j = Pr[Xi = ej ] ≥ ǫk−1 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k], then all eigenvalues of Σ but one are at least
nǫ
k−1 .
Proof. For any unit vector v ∈ Rk that is orthogonal to the all-one vector 1, i.e., ∑j vj = 0 and∑
j v
2
j = 1, combining this with the assumption that pi,j ≥ ǫk−1 we have,
Var[vTXi] = E
[(
vTXi − E
[
(vTXi)
])2]
=
n∑
j=1
pi,j
vj − n∑
j′=1
pi,j′vj′
2
≥ min
j
{pi,j} ·
n∑
j=1
v2j +
 n∑
j′=1
pi,j′vj′
2 − 2vj
 n∑
j′=1
pi,j′vj′


= min
j
{pi,j} ·
1 + n
 n∑
j′=1
pi,j′vj′
2

≥ ǫ
k − 1 .
Therefore,
vTΣv = Var[vTX] =
n∑
i=1
Var[vTXi] ≥ nǫ
k − 1 .
So, for all eigenvectors v orthogonal to 1, we have vTΣv = λvT v = λ ≥ nǫk−1 as claimed.
The following robust moment-matching lemma provides a bound on how close degree ℓmoments
need to be so that two (n, k)-PMDs are ǫ-close to each other, under the assumption that n≫ k (the
anonymous game has many players and few strategies) and pi,j ≥ ǫk−1 (every player randomizes).
Lemma 3.4 allows us to build a polynomial-size (ǫ/5)-cover for PMDs with high variance, and since
we know that there is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium with a high variance, we are guaranteed to
find one in our cover.
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Lemma 3.4. Fix 0 < c < 1 and let ǫ = n−c. Assume that n = kΩ(k) for some sufficiently large
constant in the exponent. Let X, Y be (n, k)-PMDs with X =
∑k
i=1X
i, Y =
∑k
i=1 Y
i where each
Xi, Y i is an i-maximal PMD. Let Σ and Σ′ denote the covariance matrices of X and Y respectively.
If all eigenvalues of Σ,Σ′ but one are at least ǫn/k, and for ℓ ≤ 2+2c1−c all the parameter moments
m of degree ℓ satisfy that ∣∣∣Mm(Xi)−Mm(Y i)∣∣∣ ≤ n−c.
Then, we have that dTV(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Lemma 3.4 follows from the next proposition whose proof is given in the following subsection.
Proposition 3.5. Let ǫ > 0. Let X, Y be (n, k)-PMDs with X =
∑k
i=1X
i, Y =
∑k
i=1 Y
i where
each Xi, Y i is an i-maximal PMD. Let Σ and Σ′ denote the covariance matrices of X and Y
respectively, where all eigenvalues of Σ and Σ′ but one are at least σ2, where σ ≥ poly(k log(1/ǫ)).
Suppose that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, ℓ ≥ 1, for all moments m of degree ℓ with mi = 0, we have that∣∣∣Mm(Xi)−Mm(Y i)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ · σℓ
C ′k+ℓ · k3ℓ/2+1 · logk+ℓ/2(1/ǫ) (2)
for a sufficiently large constant C ′. Then dTV (X,Y ) ≤ ǫ.
The proof of Proposition 3.5 exploits the sparsity of the continuous Fourier transform of our
PMDs, as well as careful Taylor approximations of the logarithm of the Fourier transform.
Proof of Lemma 3.4 from Proposition 3.5. In order to guarantee that dTV(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ, Proposition
3.5 requires the following condition to hold for a sufficiently large constant C ′:
∣∣∣Mm(Xi)−Mm(Y i)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
k(C ′ log(1/ǫ))k
·
( √
ǫn/k
C ′k3/2 log1/2(1/ǫ)
)ℓ
, ∀i ∈ [k], ℓ ≥ 1. (3)
To prove the lemma, we use the fact that n ≫ k and essentially ignore all the terms except
polynomials of n. Formally, we first need to show that
ǫ
k(C ′ log(1/ǫ))k
·
( √
ǫn/k
C ′k3/2 log1/2(1/ǫ)
)ℓ
≥ n−c, ∀ℓ ≥ 1,
under the assumption that c < 1, ǫ = n−c and n ≥ kO(k/(1−c)). After substituting ǫ = n−c, observe
that n1−c ≥ C ′2k4 log n, so the term inside the ℓ-th power is greater than 1. Thus, we only need to
check this inequality for ℓ = 1, which simplifies to n1−c ≥ C ′2k+2k6(log n)2k and holds true.
In addition, we need to show that condition (3) holds automatically for ℓ > 2+2c1−c . This follows
from the fact that the difference in parameter moments is at most n and n≫ k,
∣∣∣Mm(Xi)−Mm(Y i)∣∣∣ ≤ n ≤ ǫ
k(C ′ log(1/ǫ))k
·
( √
ǫn/k
C ′k3/2 log1/2(1/ǫ)
)ℓ
, ∀ℓ > 2 + 2c
1− c .
We recall some of the notations for readability before we describe the construction of our ǫ-cover
of high-variance PMDs. We use X to denote a generic (ℓ, k)-PMD for some ℓ ∈ [n], and we denote
pi,j = Pr[Xi = ej ]. We use At ⊆ [ℓ] to denote the set of t-maximal CRVs in X, where a k-CRV
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is t-maximal if et is its most likely outcome, and we use X
t =
∑
i∈At Xi to denote the t-maximal
component PMD of X. For a vector m = (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ Zk+, we define mth parameter moment of
Xt to be Mm(X
t) =
∑
i∈At
∏k
j=1 p
mj
i,j . We refer to ‖m‖1 =
∑k
j=1mj as the degree of Mm(X). We
use S to denote the set of all k-CRVs whose probabilities are multiples of ǫ20kn .
Lemma 3.4 states that the high-degree parameter moments match automatically, which allows
us to impose an appropriate grid on the low-degree moments to cover the set of high-variance
PMDs. The size of this cover can be bounded by a simple counting argument: We have at most
kO(
1
1−c
) moments with degree at most O( 11−c), and we need to approximate these moments for each
t-maximal component PMDs, so there are at most k · kO( 11−c ) = kO( 11−c ) moments Mm(Xt) that we
care about. We approximate these moments to precision n−c, and the moments are at most n, so
the size of the cover is
(
n
n−c
)kO( 11−c )
= nk
O(1/1−c)
.
We define this grid on low-degree moments formally in the following lemma. For every (ℓ, k)-
PMD X with ℓ ∈ [n], we associate some data D(X) with X, which is a vector of the approximate
values of the low-degree moments Mm(X
t) of X.
Lemma 3.6. Fix 0 < c < 1 and n, let ǫ = n−c. We define the data D(W ) of a k-CRV W as:
D(W )m,t =
{
Mm(W ) rounded to the nearest integer multiple of n
−c/n, if W is t-maximal.
0, otherwise.
For ℓ ∈ [n], we define the data of an (ℓ, k)-PMD X = ∑ℓi=1Xi to be the sum of the data of its
k-CRVs: D(X) =
∑ℓ
i=1D(Xi). The data D(X) satisfies two important properties:
1. (Representative) If D(X) = D(Y ) for two (n, k)-PMDs or two (n−1, k)-PMDs, then dTV(X,Y ) ≤
ǫ.
2. (Extensible) For independent PMDs X and Y , we have that D(X + Y ) = D(X) +D(Y ).
Proof. The extensible property follows directly from the definition of D(X). To see the repre-
sentative property, note that we round Mm(W ) to the nearest integer multiple of n
−c/n, so the
error in the moments of W is at most n−c/(2n). When we add up the data of an (n, k)-PMD or
(n − 1, k)-PMD, the error in the moments of each t-maximal component PMDs is at most n−c/2.
So if two PMDs X and Y have the same data, their low-degree moments differ by at most n−c,
and then by Lemma 3.4 we have dTV(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 2) for computing approximate equilibria is similar to the approach
used in [DP15] and [DKS16a]. We start by constructing a polynomial-sized (ǫ/5)-cover of high-
variance PMDs (Algorithm 1), and then iterate over this cover. For each element in the cover,
we compute the set of (3ǫ/5)-best-responses for each player, and then run the cover construction
algorithm again, but this time we only allow each player to choose from her (3ǫ/5)-best-responses.
If we could reconstruct a PMD whose moments are close enough to the one we started with, then
we have found an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Recall that a mixed strategy profile for a k-strategy anonymous game can be represented as a list
of k-CRVs (X1, . . . ,Xn), whereXi describes the mixed strategy of player i. Recall that (X1, . . . ,Xn)
is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium if for each player i we have E
[
uiXi(X−i)
]
≥ E[uia(X−i)] − ǫ
for all a ∈ [k], where X−i =∑j 6=iXj is the distribution of the sum of other players strategies.
9
Algorithm 1: GenerateData
Input : {Si}ni=1, ǫ > 0.
Output: The set of all possible data D of (n, k)-PMDs X =∑ni=1Xi where Xi ∈ Si.
D0 = {0};
for ℓ = 1 . . . n do
forall the D ∈ Dℓ−1 do
forall the W ∈ Sℓ do
Add D +D(W ) to Dℓ if it is not in Dℓ already;
Keep track of an (ℓ, k)-PMD whose data is D +D(W );
end
end
end
return D = Dn;
Algorithm 2: Moment Search
Input : An n-player k-strategy anonymous game G, ǫ = n−c for some c < 1.
Output: An ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of G.
Dn = GenerateData({Si = S}ni=1, ǫ/5);
Dn−1 = GenerateData({Si = S}n−1i=1 , ǫ/5);
forall the D ∈ Dn do
Set Si = ∅ for all i;
forall the Xi ∈ S do
Let D−i = D −D(Xi);
if ∃YD−i ∈ Dn−1 with D(YD−i) = D−i and Xi is a (3ǫ/5)-best response to YD−i then
Add Xi to Si;
end
end
D′n = GenerateData({Si}ni=1, ǫ/5);
if D ∈ D′n then
return (X1, . . . ,Xn) with PMD X = with D (
∑n
i=1Xi) = D in D′n;
end
end
Lemma 3.7. Fix an anonymous game G = (n, k, {uia}i∈[n],a∈[k]) with payoffs normalized to [0, 1].
Let (X1, . . . ,Xn) and (Y1, . . . , Yn) be two lists of k-CRVs. If Xi is a δ-best response to X−i, and
dTV(X−i, Y−i) ≤ ǫ, then Xi is a (δ + 2ǫ)-best response to Y−i. Moreover, if (X1, . . . ,Xn) is a
δ-approximate equilibrium, and dTV(Xi, Yi) + dTV(X−i, Y−i) ≤ ǫ for all i ∈ [n], then (Y1, . . . , Yn)
is a (δ + 2ǫ)-approximate equilibrium.
Proof. Since uia(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all a ∈ [k] and x ∈ Πkn−1, we have that∣∣∣E[uia(X−i)]− E[uia(Y−i)]∣∣∣ ≤ dTV(X−i, Y−i), ∀i ∈ [n], a ∈ [k].
Therefore, if dTV(X−i, Y−i) ≤ ǫ, and player i cannot deviate and gain more than δ when other
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players play X−i, then she cannot gain more than (δ + 2ǫ) when other players play Y−i instead
of X−i. The second claim combines the inequality above with the fact that, if player i plays Yi
instead of Xi and the mixed strategies of other players remain the same, her payoff changes by at
most dTV(Xi, Yi). Formally,∣∣∣E[uiXi(Z−i)]− E[uiYi(Z−i)]∣∣∣ ≤ dTV(Xi, Yi), ∀k-CRV Xi, Yi,∀(n− 1, k)-PMD Z−i.
The next lemma states that by rounding an (ǫ/10)-approximate equilibrium, we can obtain an
(ǫ/5)-approximate equilibrium where all the probabilities are integer multiples of ǫ20kn .
Claim 3.8. There is an (ǫ/5)-approximate Nash equilibrium (X1, . . . ,Xn), such that for all i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [k], the probabilities pi,j = Pr[Xi = ej] are multiples of ǫ20kn , and also pi,j ≥ ǫ10k .
Proof. We start with an (ǫ/10)-approximate Nash equilibrium (Y1, . . . , Yn) from Lemma 3.1 with
pi,j ≥ ǫ10k , and then round the probabilities to integer multiples of ǫ10kn . We construct Xi from Yi
as follows: for every j < k, we set Pr[Xi = ej ] to be Pr[Yi = ej ] rounded down to a multiple of
ǫ
20kn
and we set Pr[Xi = ek] = 1−
∑
j<k Pr[Xi = ej ] so the probabilities sum to 1. By triangle inequality
of total variation distance, for every i we have dTV(Xi, Yi) ≤ ǫ20n and dTV(X−i, Y−i) ≤ ǫ(n−1)20n . An
application of Lemma 3.7 shows that (X1, . . . ,Xn) is an (ǫ/5)-approximate equilibrium.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.1. We need to show that Algorithm 2 always outputs
an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium, and bound the running time.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. We first show that the output (X1, . . . ,Xn) is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium.
Recall that S is the set of all k-CRVs whose probabilities are multiples of ǫ20kn , and Si ⊆ S is the
set of approximate best-responses of player i. When we put Xi in Si, we checked that Xi is
a (3ǫ/5)-best response to YD−i , note that D(YD−i) = D − D(Xi) = D(X−i), so by Lemma 3.6
dTV
(
X−i, YD−i
) ≤ ǫ/5 for all i. By Lemma 3.7, Xi is indeed an ǫ-best response to X−i for all i.
Next we show the algorithm must always output something. By Claim 3.8 there exists an (ǫ/5)-
approximate equilibriumX ′i with eachX
′
i ∈ S. If the algorithm does not terminate successfully first,
it eventually considers D(X ′). Because X ′−i is an (n−1, k)-PMD, the algorithm can find some YD−i
with D(YD−i) = D(X
′)−D(X ′i) = D(X ′−i), and by Lemma 3.6 we have dTV
(
X ′−i, YD−i
) ≤ ǫ/5 for
all i. Since X ′i is an (ǫ/5)-best response to X
′
−i, Lemma 3.7 yields that X
′
i is a (3ǫ/5)-best response
to YD−i , so we would add each X
′
i to Si. Then our cover construction algorithm is guaranteed to
generate a set of data that includes D(X ′), and Algorithm 2 would produce an output.
Finally, we bound the running time of Algorithm 2. Let N = O
(
nk
O(1/1−c)
)
denote the size of
the (ǫ/5)-cover for the high-variance PMDs. The cover can be constructed in time O(n ·N · |S|) as
we try to add one k-CRV from S in each step. We iterate through the cover, and for each element
in the cover, we need to find the subset Si ⊆ S of (3ǫ/5)-best responses for player i, and then
run the cover construction algorithm again using only the best responses {Si}ni=1. So the overall
running time of the algorithm is O(nN |S|) ·
(
poly(nk)|S|+O(nN |S|)
)
= nk
O(1/1−c)
. When both
c < 1 and k are constants, the running time is polynomial in n, as claimed in Theorem 1.1.
3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.5
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Proposition 3.5. For two (n, k)-PMDs with variance
at least σ2 in each direction, Proposition 3.5 gives a quantitative bound on how close degree ℓ
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moments need to be (as a function of ǫ, σ, k and ℓ, but independent of n), in order for the two
PMDs to be ǫ-close in total variation distance.
The proof of Proposition 3.5 exploits the sparsity of the continuous Fourier transforms of our
PMDs, as well as careful Taylor approximations of the logarithm of the Fourier transform. The
fact that our PMDs have large variance enables us to take fewer low-degree terms in the Taylor
approximation. For technical reasons, we split our PMD as the sum of k independent component
PMDs, X =
∑k
i=1X
i, where all the k-CRVs in the component PMD Xi is i-maximal. Because
the Fourier transform of X is the product of the Fourier transform of Xi, we can just bound the
pointwise difference between the logarithm of Fourier transform of each component PMD. One
technicality is that since we have no assumption on the variances of the component PMDs Xi,
their Fourier transforms may not be sparse, so it is crucial that we bound this difference only on
the effective support of the Fourier transform of the entire PMD.
We start by considering a set S that includes the effective support of X (and Y when we show
that the means are close):
Lemma 3.9 (Essentially Corollary 5.3 of [DKS16a]). Let X be an (n, k)-PMD with mean µ and
covariance matrix Σ, such that all the non-zero eigenvalues of Σ is at least σ2 where σ ≥ poly(1/ǫ).
Let S be the set of points x ∈ Zk where (x− µ)T1 = 0 and
(x− µ)T (Σ + I)−1(x− µ) ≤ (Ck log(1/ǫ)) ,
for some sufficiently large constant C. Then, X ∈ S with probability at least 1− ǫ/2, and
|S| =
√
det(Σ + I) ·O(log(1/ǫ))k/2.
Proof. Applying Lemma 5.2 of [DKS16a], we have that (X −µ)T (Σ+ I)−1(X −µ) = O(k log(k/ǫ))
with probability at least 1 − ǫ. The set of integer coordinate points in this ellipsoid is the set S.
Note that |S| is equal to the volume of S′ =
{
y ∈ Rk : ∃x ∈ S with ‖y − x‖∞ ≤ 1/2
}
, because
S′ is the disjoint union of cubes of volume 1, one for each integer point. But S′ is again contained
in an ellipsoid with (y − µ)T (Σ + I)−1(y − µ) = O(k log(k/ǫ)), so |S| = Vol(S′) = √det(Σ + I) ·
O(log(1/ǫ))k/2.
Next we show that X̂ , the Fourier transform of X, has a relatively small effective support. We
fold the effective support onto [0, 1]k to obtain the set T . We use [x] to denote the additive distance
of x ∈ R to the closest integer, i.e., [x] = minx′∈Z |x− x′|.
Lemma 3.10. Let X be an (n, k)-PMD with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ, such that all the
non-zero eigenvalues of Σ are at least σ2 where σ ≥ poly(k log(1/ǫ)). Let S be as above. Let X̂ be
the Fourier transform of X. Let T
def
=
{
ξ ∈ [0, 1]k : ∃ξ′ ∈ ξ + Zk with ξ′TΣξ′ ≤ Ck log(1/ǫ)
}
, for
some sufficiently large constant C. Then, we have that
(i) For ξ ∈ T , and for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, [ξi − ξj] ≤ 2
√
Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ.
(ii) Vol(T )|S| = O(C log(1/ǫ))k.
(iii)
∫
[0,1]k\T
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)∣∣∣ dξ ≤ ǫ/(2|S|).
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Lemma 3.10 is a technical generalization of Lemma 5.5 of [DKS16a]. Its proof is deferred to
Appendix A. This lemma establishes that the contribution to the Fourier transform X̂ coming from
points outside of T is negligibly small. We then use the sparsity of the Fourier transform to show
that, if two PMDs have Fourier transforms that are pointwise sufficiently close within the effective
support T , then the two PMDs are close in total variation distance.
Lemma 3.11. Let X, Y , S, T be as above. If
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ(C ′ log(1/ǫ))−k for all ξ ∈ T and
a sufficiently large constant C ′, then dTV (X,Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof. For any x ∈ Zk, taking the inverse Fourier transform, we have that Pr[X = x] = ∫ξ∈[0,1]k e(−ξ·
x)X̂(ξ)dξ and similarly Pr[Y = x] =
∫
ξ∈[0,1]k e(−ξ · x)Ŷ (ξ)dξ. Thus,
|Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
ξ∈[0,1]k
e(−ξ · x)
(
X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)
)
dξ
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
ξ∈[0,1]k
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ dξ
=
∫
ξ∈T
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ dξ + ∫
ξ∈[0,1]k\T
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ dξ
≤ Vol(T ) · ǫ(C ′ log(1/ǫ))−k + ǫ
2|S|
≤ O(C log(1/ǫ))
k
|S| · ǫ(C
′ log(1/ǫ))−k +
ǫ
2|S|
≤ ǫ|S| .
Since X and Y are outside of S each with probability less than ǫ/2, we have that dTV (X,Y ) ≤
ǫ/2 + 12
∑
x∈S |Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]| ≤ ǫ.
We now have all the ingredients to prove Proposition 3.5. For two PMDs X and Y that are
close in their low-degree moments, we show that their Fourier transforms X̂ and Ŷ are pointwise
close on T , and then by Lemma 3.11, X and Y are close in total variation distance.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Let X, Y , S, T be as above. Given Lemma 3.11, we only need to show
that ∀ξ ∈ T ,
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ(C ′ log(1/ǫ))−k.
Fix ξ ∈ T . We first examine, without loss of generality, the Fourier transform X̂k of the
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k-maximal component PMD. Let Ak ⊆ [n] denote the set of k-maximal CRVs.
X̂k(ξ) =
∏
i∈Ak
k∑
j=1
e(ξj)pi,j
= e(|Ak|ξk)
∏
i∈Ak
1− k−1∑
j=1
(1− e(ξj − ξk))pi,j)

= e(|Ak|ξk) exp
∑
i∈Ak
log
1− k−1∑
j=1
(1− e(ξj − ξk))pi,j)

= e(|Ak|ξk) exp
− ∑
i∈Ak
∞∑
ℓ=1
1
ℓ
k−1∑
j=1
(1− e(ξj − ξk))pi,j)

= e(|Ak|ξk) exp
− ∑
m∈Zk−1+
(
‖m‖1
m
)
1
‖m‖1
Mm(X
k)
k−1∏
j=1
(1− e(ξj − ξk))mj
 (4)
For notational convenience, we use ΨkX to denote the expression inside exp(·) in Equation (4). A
similar formula holds for the Fourier transform X̂i and Ŷ i of other i-maximal PMDs, and we use
ΨiX and Ψ
i
Y to denote the corresponding expressions inside exp(·). Since the Fourier transform of
a PMD is the product of the Fourier transform of its component PMDs, we have
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣
k∏
t=1
X̂t(ξ)−
k∏
t=1
Ŷ t(ξ)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣e
(
k∑
t=1
|At|ξt
)
k∏
t=1
(
exp
(
ΨtX
)
− exp
(
ΨtY
))∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2π
k∑
t=1
∣∣∣ΨtX −ΨtY ∣∣∣ ,
where the last inequality is due to e(
∑k
t=1 |At|ξt) = 1, and |exp(a)− exp(b)| ≤ |a− b| if the real
parts of a and b satisfy Re(a),Re(b) ≤ 0.
So to prove that X̂(ξ) and Ŷ (ξ) are pointwise close for all ξ ∈ T , it is enough to bound from
above 2π
∑k
t=1
∣∣ΨtX −ΨtY ∣∣. We use the fact that |1− e(ξj − ξk)| = O([ξj − ξk]), and recall that [ξi−
ξj] ≤ 2
√
Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ by Lemma 3.10. We also use the multinomial identity
∑
m∈Zk−1+ ,‖m‖1=ℓ
( ℓ
m
)
=
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(k − 1)ℓ. When C ′ is a sufficiently large constant, we have
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)− Ŷ (ξ)∣∣∣ ≤ 2π k∑
t=1
∣∣∣ΨtX −ΨtY ∣∣∣
= 2π
k∑
t=1
∑
m∈Zk−1+
(
‖m‖1
m
)
1
‖m‖1
∣∣∣Mm(Xt)−Mm(Y t)∣∣∣ k−1∏
j=1
(1− e(ξj − ξk))mj
≤ 2π
∞∑
ℓ=1
(k − 1)ℓ
ℓ
(
O
(√
k log(1/ǫ)
σ
))ℓ k∑
t=1
max
m∈Zk−1+ ,‖m‖1=ℓ
∣∣∣Mm(Xt)−Mm(Y t)∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
ℓ=1
kℓ
(
C ′
√
k log(1/ǫ)
2σ
)ℓ
k · ǫσ
ℓ
C ′k+ℓ · k3ℓ/2+1 · logk+ℓ/2(1/ǫ)
=
∞∑
ℓ=1
2−ℓǫ(C ′ log(1/ǫ))−k
= ǫ(C ′ log(1/ǫ))−k .
4 Reductions: Proof of Theorem 1.3
In this section, we show that even a slight improvement of our upper bound would imply an FPTAS
for computing (well-supported) Nash equilibria in anonymous games (Theorem 1.3). It is a plausible
conjecture that assuming ETH for PPAD, there is no such FPTAS, in which case our upper bound
(Theorem 1.1) is essentially tight.
Theorem 1.3 follows directly from the following two lemmas. Lemma 4.1 converts an ǫ
2
4n -
approximate Nash equilibrium into an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium4, by reallocating each
player’s probabilities on strategies with low expected payoffs to the best-response strategy (first
observed in [DGP09]). Lemma 4.2 then uses a padding argument to show that, for ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium, the question of whether there is a polynomial-time algorithm for ǫ = n−c is
equivalent for all constants c > 0.
Lemma 4.1. For any n-player game whose payoffs are normalized to be between [0, 1], if we have
an oracle for computing players’ payoffs, we can efficiently convert an ǫ
2
4n -approximate equilibrium
into an ǫ-well-supported equilibrium.
Proof. Take an ǫ
2
4n -approximate equilibrium of the game. We call a strategy “good” for a player if
the strategy is an ǫ2 -best response for the player, and we call it “bad” otherwise. A player can put
at most probability ǫ2n on the “bad” strategies without violating the
ǫ2
4n -approximate equilibrium
condition. We move all the probabilities on “bad” strategies for all players to (any one of) their best
responses simultaneously. After moving the probabilities, every player assigns non-zero probabilities
only to the “good” strategies. Since the total probability we moved is at most ǫ2 and the payoffs
are in [0, 1], the previously “good” strategies ( ǫ2 -best responses) are now ǫ-best responses.
4A mixed strategy profile s is a well-supported Nash equilibrium iff ∀i ∈ [n], ∀a, a′ ∈ [k], we have Ex∼s−i
[
uia(x)
]
>
Ex∼s−i
[
uia′(x)
]
+ ǫ =⇒ si(a
′) = 0, i.e., players can only put non-zero probability on ǫ-best-response strategies.
15
Lemma 4.2. For n-player k-strategy anonymous games with k = O(1), if an 1nγ -well-supported
equilibrium can be computed in time O(nd) for constants γ, d > 0, then there is an FPTAS for
computing approximate-well-supported Nash equilibria in anonymous games.
Proof. Let ǫ be the desired quality of the well-supported equilibrium. If 1nγ ≤ ǫ we are done, so we
assume n is smaller. We set n′ = (1/ǫ)1/γ , so that 1n′γ = ǫ. Given an n-player anonymous game
G, we build an n′-player anonymous game G′ as follows: we add n′ − n dummy players, and give
the dummy players utility 1 on strategy 1, and 0 on any other strategies so in any ǫ-well-supported
equilibria, the dummy player must all play strategy 1 with probability 1. (Note that this is only true
for ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium; in an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium, the dummy players
can put ǫ probability elsewhere.) We shift the utility function of the actual players to ignore the
dummy players on strategy 1. Formally, the payoff structure of G′ is given by:
• For each i > n,
u′ia(x) =
{
1 if a = 1
0 otherwise
• For each i ≤ n, we subtract the number of players on strategy 1 by n′−n and then apply the
original utility function. We define φ : Zk → Zk as φ(x1, . . . , xk) = (x1− (n′−n), x2, . . . , xk),
u′ia(x) =
{
uia(φ(x)) if x1 ≥ n′ − n
0 otherwise
Since ǫ = 1n′γ , by assumption we can compute an ǫ-well-supported equilibrium of G
′ in time O(n′d),
and we can simply remove the dummy players to obtain an ǫ-equilibrium of the original game G.
The running time is O(n′d) = poly(n, 1/ǫ) when γ = Θ(1).
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Assume that we can compute an O(n−c)-approximate equilibrium in poly-
nomial time for some constant c > 1. Let γ = c− 1, so we can compute an O
(
1
n1+γ
)
-approximate
equilibrium in polynomial time. By Lemma 4.1, we can convert it into an O
(
1
nγ/2
)
-well-supported
equilibrium. Lemma 4.2 then states that any polynomial-time algorithm that computes a well-
supported Nash equilibrium of an inverse polynomial precision gives an FPTAS for computing
well-supported Nash equilibria in anonymous games.
5 Proof of Theorem 1.2
In this section, we present a faster algorithm that computes an O˜
(
n−1/3k11/3
)
-approximate Nash
equilibrium in n player k strategy anonymous games. Note that this algorithm always runs in
polynomial time in the input size, without assuming any relationship between n and k.
Our approach builds on the idea of [GT15] to “smooth” an anonymous game by forcing all the
players to randomize. We prove that the perturbed game is Lipschitz and therefore admits a pure
Nash equilibrium (Lemma 5.1), which corresponds to simple approximate equilibria of a specific
form in the original game: Each player plays one strategy with probability 1− δ for some small δ,
and plays other strategies uniformly at random with probability δ. To prove the perturbed game is
Lipschitz (Proposition 5.2), we rely on the recently established multivariate central limit theorem
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(CLT) of [DDKT16, DKS16a] to show that for δ = Ω(n−1/3) the associated PMD is close to a
discrete Gaussian.
Recall that an anonymous game G = (n, k, {uia}i∈[n],a∈[k]) is λ-Lipschitz if
∀i ∈ [n],∀a ∈ [k], ∀x, y ∈ Πkn−1,
∣∣∣uia(x)− uia(y)∣∣∣ ≤ λ‖x− y‖1.
An approximate pure Nash equilibrium always exists in Lipschitz anonymous games.
Lemma 5.1 ([DP15, AS13]). Every λ-Lipschitz anonymous game with k strategies admits a (2kλ)-
approximate pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, such an approximate equilibrium can be found in
time O˜(n+ k) times the description size of the game.
We perturb the input game G to get another game Gδ as follows. Let Xδ(ej) denote the k-CRV
that takes value ej with probability 1 − δ, and takes value ej′ with probability δk−1 for all other
j′ 6= j. When a player plays the strategy j in the perturbed game Gδ, it is as if she is playing
Xδ(ej) in the original game G. For example, the strategy (1, 0, . . . , 0) in Gδ maps back to the mixed
strategy (1− δ, δk−1 , . . . , δk−1) in G.
By forcing all players to randomize, we increase the uncertainty in the outcome of the game
(i.e., the variance of the resulting PMD), and thus making the game “smoother”. As we will prove
later, the perturbed game Gδ is λ-Lipschitz for λ = O˜
(
k9/2√
nδ
)
. It then follows from Lemma 5.1 that
there exists a (2kλ)-pure Nash equilibrium of Gδ , which is a (δ + 2kλ)-mixed Nash equilibrium
of G. The next proposition formally defines the payoff structure of Gδ, and bounds its Lipschitz
constant.
Proposition 5.2. Given an anonymous game G = (n, k, {uia}i∈[n],a∈[k]) with payoffs normalized to
[0, 1], we define an anonymous game Gδ = (n, k, {u′ia}i∈[n],a∈[k]) as follows,
∀i ∈ [n], a ∈ [k], x ∈ Πkn−1, u′ia(x) := (1− δ) E
x′∼Mδ(x)
[
uia(x
′)
]
+
δ
k − 1
∑
a′ 6=a
E
x′∼Mδ(x)
[
uia′(x
′)
]
,
where Mδ(x) =
∑
j∈[k] xjXδ(ej) is an (n− 1, k)-PMD that corresponds to the perturbed outcome of
the partition x ∈ Πkn−1. Then Gδ is O˜
(
k9/2√
nδ
)
-Lipschitz.
We defer the proof of Proposition 5.2 to the next subsection. We now show how Theorem 1.2
follows from Proposition 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Proposition 5.2 shows that Gδ is O˜
(
k9/2√
nδ
)
-Lipschitz. By Lemma 5.1, there
exists a (2kλ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium in Gδ, and as noted in [DP15], such an ap-
proximate equilibrium can be found in total number of bit operations that is O˜(n+ k) times the
description size of Gδ, by enumerating pure strategy profiles and solving maximum flows to match
players to mixed strategies. Since we can compute the payoff structure of Gδ in polynomial-time
given the input game G, the overall running time is polynomial in the input size.
We now bound the quality of the approximate Nash equilibrium. Note that a (2kλ)-pure
equilibrium of Gδ is a (δ + 2kλ)-mixed Nash equilibrium of G, since an ǫ-equilibrium in Gδ means
that players cannot gain more than ǫ by deviating to the mixed strategies of the form Xδ(ej) =
(1 − δ)ej + δk−1(1 − ej), so they gain at most (δ + 2kλ) by deviating to any ej. Because changing
what a player is doing δ fraction of the time can change her payoff by at most δ. Therefore, we
can compute an (δ + 2kλ) = O˜
(
δ + k
11/2√
nδ
)
-equilibrium of the original game G in polynomial-time
for any δ > 0. Finally, setting δ = k
11/3
n1/3
, we get an O˜
(
k11/3
n1/3
)
-approximate Nash equilibrium.
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5.1 Proof of Proposition 5.2
This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 5.2. We will make use of the following two
results. The first lemma is the multivariate central limit theorem from [DKS16a], which states
that if an (n, k)-PMD X has high variance in all directions orthogonal to the all ones vector 1
(its variance along 1 is 0), then the projection of X on the first (k − 1) coordinates is close to a
discretized Gaussian distribution with the same mean vector and covariance matrix.
Lemma 5.3 ([DKS16a]). Let X be an (n, k)-PMD, and X ′ be a (k − 1)-dimensional random
variable that is the projection of X onto its first k− 1 coordinates. Let Σ′ be the covariance matrix
of X ′. Suppose that Σ′ has no eigenvectors with eigenvalue less than σ′2. Let G′ be the distribution
obtained by sampling from N (E[X ′] ,Σ′) and rounding to the nearest point in Zk. Then, we have
that
dTV
(
X ′, G′
) ≤ O(k7/2√log3(σ′)/σ′).
The second simple lemma states that if two k-dimensional Gaussian distributions have similar
mean vectors and variances (in all directions), then they are close in total variation distance.
Lemma 5.4 ([DDKT16]). For two k-dimensional Gaussians X ∼ N (µ1,Σ1) and Y ∼ N (µ2,Σ2),
such that for all unit vector v,
∣∣∣vT (µ1 − µ2)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫsv, and ∣∣∣vT (Σ1 −Σ2)v∣∣∣ ≤ ǫs2v
2
√
k
,
where s2v = max{vTΣ1v, vTΣ2v}. Then dTV(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. To prove the game Gδ is λ-Lipschitz, we need to show that
∀i ∈ [n],∀a ∈ [k], ∀x, y ∈ Πkn−1,
∣∣∣∣∣ Ex′∼Mδ(x)
[
uia(x
′)
]
− E
y′∼Mδ(y)
[
uia(y
′)
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ λ‖x− y‖1.
In fact, because the payoff entries are normalized in [0, 1], it is sufficient to show that the total
variation distance between the (n− 1, k)-PMDs Mδ(x) and Mδ(y) is small, namely
∀x, y ∈ Πkn−1, dTV(Mδ(x),Mδ(y)) ≤ λ‖x− y‖1.
Let M ′δ(x) and M
′
δ(y) be the distributions Mδ(x) and Mδ(y) projected onto their first k − 1 co-
ordinates. Note that since all coordinates must sum to n, the kth coordinate is redundant and
so dTV(Mδ(x),Mδ(y)) = dTV(M
′
δ(x),M
′
δ(y)). To show that M
′
δ(x) and M
′
δ(y) are close in total
variation distance, we first prove that the covariance matrix of M ′δ(x) has high variance in all di-
rections, which allows us to use the multivariate central limit theorem (Lemma 5.3) to conclude
that both M ′δ(x) and M
′
δ(y) are close to the (discretized) Gaussian distributions with the same
mean vectors and covariance matrices respectively. We then bound from above the total variation
distance between two high-variance k-dimensional Gaussian distributions whose mean vectors are
essentially x and y.
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Recall that Mδ(x) is the sum of n − 1 independent k-CRVs, and let Σ1 denote the covariance
matrix of Mδ(x). For any unit vector v ∈ Rk that is orthogonal to the all-one vector, we have
Var[vTXδ(ej)] = E
[(
vTXδ(ej)
)2]− (E[vTXδ(ej)])2
= (1− δ)v2j +
δ
k − 1
∑
j′ 6=j
v2j′ −
(1− δ)vj + δ
k − 1
∑
j′ 6=j
vj′
2
= (1− δ)v2j +
δ
k − 1(1− v
2
j )−
(
(1− δ)vj − δ
k − 1vj
)2
≥ δ
k − 1 ,
where we simplify the expression using the fact that
∑
j vj = 0 and
∑
j v
2
j = 1, and then take deriva-
tive to minimize it. Therefore, for any unit vector v, vTΣ1v = Var[v
TMδ(x)] =
∑
j∈[k] xj Var[vTXδ(ej)] ≥
(n−1)δ
k−1 , which implies that Σ1 has no eigenvalues less than
(n−1)δ
k−1 (except the one associated with
1). We then use the following lemma to bound from below the eigenvalues of Σ′1:
Lemma 5.5. Suppose that Σ is a positive semidefinite matrix with Σ1 = 0 and that all other
eigenvalues of Σ are at least σ2. Then for all vectors w ∈ Rk with wk = 0, we have that
wTΣw
wTw
≥ σ2/k.
Proof. Let w be a vector that minimizes w
TΣw
wTw
over w ∈ Rk with wk = 0. Then v = w− wT1k 1 has
vT1 = 0 and so vTΣv ≥ σ2vT v. We have vTΣv = wTΣw since v − w is a multiple of 1, and we
have
vT v =
(
w − w
T1
k
1
)T (
w − w
T1
k
1
)
= wTw + (wT1)2/k − 2(wT1)2/k
= ‖w‖22 − ‖w‖21/k
≥ wTw/k ,
where the last line follows from the inequality ‖w‖1 ≤
√
k − 1‖w‖2. Thus, we have that
wTΣw
wTw
≥ v
TΣv
kvT v
≥ σ2/k.
Since all except one eigenvalues of each of Σ1 and Σ2 are at least
(n−1)δ
(k−1) , the minimum eigenval-
ues of Σ′1 and Σ
′
2 are at least
(n−1)δ
k2
. Let Z(µ,Σ) be the discretized Gaussian obtained by rounding
N (µ,Σ) to the nearest integer in every coordinate. Then, by Lemma 5.3, we have
dTV
(
M ′δ(x),Z(µ′1,Σ′1)
) ≤ O˜( k9/2√
nδ
)
, dTV
(
M ′δ(y),Z(µ′2,Σ′2)
) ≤ O˜( k9/2√
nδ
)
. (5)
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Next, we use Lemma 5.4 to bound the total variation distance between the k-dimensional Gaus-
sian distributions N (µ′1,Σ′1) and N (µ′2,Σ′2). Let µ1, µ2 and Σ1,Σ2 be the mean vectors and the
covariance matrices of Mδ(x) and Mδ(y) respectively. Observe that
µ1 =
(
1− kδ
k − 1
)
x+ δ1.
So, for any unit vector v ∈ Rk,
s2v = max{vTΣ1v, vTΣ2v} ≥
(n− 1)δ
k − 1 ,∣∣∣vT (µ1 − µ2)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣vT ((1− kδk − 1
)
x−
(
1− kδ
k − 1
)
y
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− kδk − 1
)
‖x− y‖1 ≤ ‖x− y‖1.
If the unit vector v is orthogonal to 1, we can use the expression for vTΣ1v we had earlier. Taking
derivative with respect to vj shows that Var[v
TXδ(ej)] is maximized at v = ±ej. Hence, we can
write ∣∣∣vT (Σ1 − Σ2)v∣∣∣ = ∑
j∈[k]
(xj − yj)Var[vTXδ(ej)] ≤ ‖x− y‖1maxj Var[v
TXδ(ej)]
≤ ‖x− y‖1
[
(1− δ) −
(
1− kδ
k − 1
)2]
=
k − 1
k + 1
δ‖x− y‖1 ≤ δ‖x − y‖1.
To see that the upper bound on
∣∣∣vT (Σ1 − Σ2)v∣∣∣ holds for all unit vectors, observe that for both
covariance matrices it holds Σ11 = Σ21 = 0. For any unit vector v
′, we can take its projection
onto the subspace orthogonal to 1, and write v′ as a linear combination αv + β1, for some α < 1
and a unit vector v that is orthogonal to 1. That is,∣∣∣v′T (Σ1 − Σ2)v′∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(αv + β1)T (Σ1 − Σ2)(αv + β1)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣α2vT (Σ1 − Σ2)v∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣vT (Σ1 − Σ2)v∣∣∣ .
Thus, for all unit vectors v ∈ Rk, we have
∣∣∣vT (µ1 − µ2)∣∣∣ ≤ ‖x− y‖1 and ∣∣∣vT (Σ1 − Σ2)v∣∣∣ ≤
δ‖x− y‖1. In particular, this holds for vectors with kth coordinate 0. Hence, for all v ∈ Rk−1,
we have
∣∣∣vT (µ′1 − µ′2)∣∣∣ ≤ ‖x− y‖1 and ∣∣∣vT (Σ′1 − Σ′2)v∣∣∣ ≤ δ‖x − y‖1.
Finally, we set ǫ = O
( √
k√
nδ
+ k
3/2
n
)
‖x− y‖1 to satisfy the requirements of Lemma 5.4, and there-
fore dTV(N (µ′1,Σ′1),N (µ′2,Σ′2)) ≤ ǫ. By the data processing inequality, rounding both distributions
to the nearest integer coordinates does not increase their total variation distance, therefore
dTV
(Z(µ′1,Σ′1),Z(µ′2,Σ′2)) ≤ ǫ. (6)
By the triangle inequality, Equations (5) and (6) yield
dTV(Mδ(x),Mδ(y)) = dTV
(
M ′δ(x),M
′
δ(y)
)
≤ dTV
(
M ′δ(x),Z(µ′1,Σ′1)
)
+ dTV
(Z(µ′1,Σ′1),Z(µ′2,Σ′2))+ dTV(Z(µ′2,Σ′2),M ′δ(y))
≤ O˜
(
k9/2√
nδ
)
+O
( √
k√
nδ
+
k3/2
n
)
‖x− y‖1
≤ O˜
(
k9/2√
nδ
)
‖x− y‖1.
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The last inequality holds becauseMδ(x) =Mδ(y) when x = y, so we can assume that ‖x− y‖1 ≥ 1.
This concludes the proof that Gδ is λ-Lipschitz for λ = O˜
(
k9/2√
nδ
)
.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 3.10
This lemma is a generalization of Lemma 5.5 of [DKS16a], which assumes that ǫ = O˜k(1/σ). Thus,
we need to be careful about where this relation was used in the proof.
Note that for a fixed ξ, if ξ′ satisfies ξ′ ∈ ξ + Zk and ξ′TΣξ′ ≤ Ck log(1/ǫ), then so does ξ + i1
for all i ∈ Z. We define T ′ as T ′ def=
{
ξ′ ∈ Rk : ξ′TΣξ′ ≤ Ck log(1/ǫ) and 0 ≤ ξ′ · 1 ≤ k
}
. Then,
ξ ∈ T if and only if there is a ξ′ ∈ T ′ with ξ − ξ′ ∈ Zk.
(i) Because ξ − ξ′ ∈ Zk, we have [ξi − ξj] ≤
∣∣∣ξ′i − ξ′j∣∣∣. So to prove (i), we need to show that∣∣∣ξ′i − ξ′j∣∣∣ ≤ 2√Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ for all ξ′ ∈ T ′, i and j.
Fix ξ′ ∈ T ′, we define ξ˜′ to be the projection of ξ′ onto the subspace orthogonal to 1, i.e.,
ξ˜′ = ξ′− ξ′·1k 1. Since Σ1 = 0 and all other eigenvalues of Σ are at least σ2, for all i, j we have∣∣∣ξ′i − ξ′j∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ξ˜′i − ξ˜′j∣∣∣ ≤ 2‖ξ˜′‖∞ ≤ 2‖ξ˜′‖2 ≤ 2√ξ′TΣξ′/σ2 ≤ 2√Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ.
This proves (i).
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(ii) Next we consider Vol(T ′). If ξ′ ∈ T ′, we know that ‖ξ′− (ξ′ ·1/k)1‖22 ≤ Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ2. Also
0 ≤ ξ′ · 1 ≤ k implies that ‖(ξ′ · 1/k)1‖22 ≤ k. Because these two vectors are orthogonal, we
can write
‖ξ′‖22 =
∥∥∥∥ξ′ − ξ′ · 1k 1
∥∥∥∥2
2
+
∥∥∥∥ξ′ · 1k 1
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ2 + k ≤ 2Ck log(1/ǫ),
where the last inequality holds by the assumption that σ ≥ 1. Thus,
ξ′T (Σ + I)ξ′ = ξ′TΣξ′ + ‖ξ′‖22 ≤ 3Ck log(1/ǫ).
By Claim 5.4 of [DKS16a], we get that
Vol(T ′) ≤ det(Σ + I)−1/2O(C log(1/ǫ))k/2.
It then follows from Lemma 3.9 that Vol(T ′)|S| = O(C log(1/ǫ))k.
To show (ii), we need to show that Vol(T ) ≤ Vol(T ′). Note that T ′ is a disjoint union of its
intersections with unit cubes with integer corners, and so
Vol(T ′) =
∑
b∈Zk
Vol
(
T ′ ∩
k∏
i=1
[bi, bi + 1)
)
.
On the other hand, T is the union of translations of these sets
T =
⋃
b∈Zk
{ξ′ − b : ξ ∈ T ′ ∩
k∏
i=1
[bi, bi + 1)} ,
so Vol(T ) ≤ Vol(T ′).
(iii) By the pigeonhole principle, for every ξ ∈ Rk, there is an interval Iξ of length kk+1 such that
there exists ξ′ ∈ ξ + Zk where all the coordinates of ξ′ are in Iξ. We define Tm to be
Tm
def
=
{
ξ ∈ [0, 1]k : ∃ξ′ ∈
(
ξ + Zk
)
∩ Ikξ and 2mCk log(σ) ≤ ξ′TΣξ′ ≤ 2m+1Ck log(σ)
}
.
Then, we have that T ∪ (⋃∞m=0 Tm) = [0, 1]k , although these sets need not be disjoint. Thus,
[0, 1]k/T ⊆ ⋃∞m=0 Tm and so∫
[0,1]k/T
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)∣∣∣ dξ ≤ ∞∑
m=0
Vol(Tm) sup
ξ∈Tm
|X̂(ξ)|.
If we apply (ii) of this lemma with 2m+1C instead of C, the resulting set T would be a
superset of Tm. Thus, we have that Vol(Tm) ≤ O
(
2m+1C log(1/ǫ)
)k
/|S|. To show (iii), we
bound supξ∈Tm |X̂(ξ)| using the following claim, which gives a “Gaussian decay” upper bound
on the magnitude of the Fourier transform.
Claim A.1. For ξ ∈ Tm, it holds |X̂(ξ)| ≤ exp(−Ω(C2m log(1/ǫ)/k)). If additionally we have
m ≤ 3 log2 k, then |X̂(ξ)| = exp(−Ω(C2mk log(1/ǫ))).
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Proof. We take ξ′ ∈
(
ξ + Zk
)
∩ Ikξ as in the definition of Tm. Lemma 3.10 of [DKS16a] gives
that if the coordinates of ξ′ lie in an interval of length 1− δ, then
|X̂(ξ)| = |X̂(ξ′)| ≤ exp(−Ω(δ2ξ′T · Σ · ξ′)) = exp(−Ω(C2mk log(1/ǫ)δ2)).
By the definition of Tm, we take δ =
1
k+1 to get the bound |X̂(ξ)| ≤ exp(−Ω(C2m log(1/ǫ)/k)).
To get the stronger bound, we need to show that when m is small all coordinates of ξ′ are in
a shorter interval. This is because, if we apply (i) of this lemma with 2m+1C instead of C,
we have |ξ′i − ξ′j| ≤
√
2m+3Ck log(1/ǫ)/σ for any i, j. When m ≤ log2(σ/(Ck log(1/ǫ))) − 4,
we can take δ = 1/2 and obtain the stronger bound of the claim.
This is where we use our assumption that σ ≥ poly(k log(1/ǫ)). We need m ≤ 3 log2 k ≤
log2(σ/(Ck log(1/ǫ))) − 4, which holds when σ ≥ 16Ck4 log(1/ǫ).
Finally, for (iii) we can write∫
[0,1]k/T
∣∣∣X̂(ξ)∣∣∣ dξ ≤ ∞∑
m=0
Vol(Tm) sup
ξ∈Tm
|X̂(ξ)|
≤
∞∑
m=0
O
(
2m+1C log(1/ǫ)
)k
sup
ξ∈Tm
|X̂(ξ)|
≤ O(C log(1/ǫ))
k
|S|
∞∑
m=0
2mk sup
ξ∈Tm
|X̂(ξ)| .
We divide this sum into two pieces:
3 log2 k∑
m=0
2mk sup
ξ∈Tm
|X̂(ξ)| ≤
3 log2 k∑
m=0
2mk exp(−Ω(C2mk log(1/ǫ)))
≤
3 log2 k∑
m=0
exp(−Ω(C(2m −m)k log(1/ǫ)))
≤
3 log2 k∑
m=0
2−m exp(−Ω(Ck log(1/ǫ)))
≤ exp(−Ω(Ck log(1/ǫ))) = ǫΩ(Ck) ,
and
∞∑
m=3 log2 k
2mk sup
ξ∈Tm
|X̂(ξ)| ≤
∞∑
m=3 log2 k
2mk exp(−Ω(C2m log(1/ǫ)/k))
≤
∞∑
m=3 log2 k
exp(−Ω(C(2m −mk2) log(1/ǫ)/k))
≤
∞∑
m=3 log2 k
exp(−Ω(C(k2 +mk) log(1/ǫ)/k))
≤
∞∑
m=3 log2 k
2−m exp(−Ω(Ck log(1/ǫ))) ≤ ǫΩ(Ck) .
We thus have
∫
[0,1]k\T |X̂(ξ)|dξ ≤ O(C log(1/ǫ))kǫΩ(Ck)/|S| ≤ ǫ/(2|S|).
24
